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Abstract
This paper analyses the role of bank lending in the monetary transmission process
in Germany. We follow a sectoral approach by distinguishing corporate lending and
household lending. We nd that banks respond to a monetary contraction by adjust-
ing their securities holdings, rather than reducing their loans portfolio. Most lending
categories even show an increase following a monetary tightening. The main impli-
cation of our results is that a bank lending channel is not an important transmission
mechanism. On the contrary, by insulating their loans portfolio from monetary shocks,
banks are more likely to weaken than to strengthen the impact of monetary policy.
Keywords: monetary transmission, bank lending channel, Germany
JEL Classication No.: E44, E51, E52
Corresponding author: Jan Kakes, De Nederlandsche Bank, Monetary and Economic Policy Depart-
ment, PO Box 98, 1000 AB Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Email: J.I.Kakes@dnb.nl
yUniversity of Groningen, Faculty of Economics, the Netherlands.
We thank Peter van Bergeijk, Gabe de Bondt, Harry Garretsen, Jakob de Haan and Jan Jacobs for useful
comments on earlier versions of this paper. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily represent
those of De Nederlandsche Bank.
11 Introduction
Germany is widely considered as one of the most typical examples of a bank-based economy.
Over 70% of rms' external nance is provided by banks, which is in contrast with market-
based systems like the United States, where only 25% of the nancing needs comes from
banks.1 As a result, one may expect that the German banking sector plays a key role in
the transmission of monetary policy.
In this paper, we consider the relevance of a bank lending channel in Germany over the
period 1970{1997. According to this transmission mechanism, banks respond to a mon-
etary contraction by reducing the supply of bank loans which has, eventually, a negative
impact on inﬂation and real activity. However, the implications of the German institu-
tional setting for the eectiveness of monetary policy through bank lending are ap r i o r i
ambiguous. On the one hand, the mere fact that banks play an important role suggests
that the scope for an eective bank lending channel is potentially huge. On the other
hand, banks may try to shield their loans portfolio from monetary disturbances which
may weaken, rather than strengthen, the impact of monetary policy. This may be plausi-
ble for Germany, given the importance that is attached to long-term relationships between
banks and their clients.
The importance of a bank lending channel is therefore an empirical matter. Empirical
studies have come to dierent conclusions. On the basis of a number of qualitative indi-
cators Kashyap and Stein (1997a) conclude that a lending channel in Germany is more
likely to be relevant than in most other countries of the European Union. VAR studies
by Barran et al. (1995, 1996) and Guender and Moersch (1997), however, suggest that a
bank lending channel is not important in Germany.
We extend the existing VAR literature by considering several types of bank loans,
distinguishing two sectors (rms and households) and dierent maturities (short-term,
medium-term and long-term loans). As we will explain below, a disaggregated approach
is one of the possible ways to deal with an important identication problem. Our results
imply that a bank lending channel is not relevant for either of these lending categories. On
the contrary, as the responses of most credit aggregates following a monetary contraction
are positive or insignicant, bank lending probably decreases the impact of monetary
policy on real activity.
Because the start of EMU in 1999 marks the end of independent German monetary
policy, one may question to what extent our ndings are still relevant today. It should
be noted, though, that the monetary strategy of the Eurosystem is not fundamentally
dierent from the Bundesbank's monetary strategy. In addition, the institutional setting
underlying the monetary transmission mechanism is not likely to change immediately.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we brieﬂy discuss
monetary transmission, particularly the theory underlying the bank lending channel. Sub-
sequently, we present our empirical results in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
1The Economist, November 21, 1998, pp. 75{76.
22 Monetary transmission and bank lending
In recent years, a vast literature developed on the eectiveness of monetary policy and the
channels through which this policy works. This renewed interest in monetary transmission
must be seen within the context of a revival of theories that stress the impact of the
nancial system on aggregate economic activity.
In the rst decades after the war, the role of credit market imperfections in the mone-
tary transmission process was largely ignored in the mainstream literature. This conven-
tional approach is also known as the money view. Following e.g., the IS-LM model, only
two nancial assets are distinguished, money and bonds, of which the latter is supposed to
be representative for the whole capital market. Since banks do not play an essential role in
this world, there is no need to distinguish bank loans from other bank assets. According to
this approach, monetary policy works primarily through its impact on the capital market
interest rate.
In contrast, an important strand of the recent literature, gathered under the name
credit view, focuses on nancial phenomena that are likely to play a role in the transmission
of monetary policy, such as nancial intermediation and credit rationing. Starting from
the assumptions that the capital market is characterized by imperfections and that bank
assets|in particular bank loans and security holdings|are imperfect substitutes, various
transmission channels may work on top of the standard interest rate channel.2 One of these
channels is the bank lending channel. The relevance of this mechanism follows directly from
the fact that banks have a specic function as nancial intermediaries, which is in contrast
with their role in the money view. Hence, the focus is on the specialness of the asset side of
the banking sector's balance sheet. If part of the borrowers are bank dependent|i.e.,t h e y
cannot easily switch to alternative forms of external nancing|and if banks consider bank
loans as imperfect substitutes for other entries on the asset side of their balance sheets,
monetary policy may operate through a bank lending channel.3 These are in fact necessary
conditions for a bank lending channel to be operative. Otherwise, banks could use their
other assets as a liquidity buer against monetary shocks which enable them to protect
their loans portfolio, while borrowers could easily neutralize the impact of monetary policy
by attracting alternative sources of funding, making a bank lending channel impotent.
It is important to note that the credit view does not preclude the mechanism under-
lying the money view, but rather provides a more general approach, allowing for various
mechanisms that either exacerbate the eects of the interest rate channel, or can be con-
sidered as an additional monetary transmission channel. Obviously, if nancial market
2In the modern theoretical literature, these capital market imperfections are attributed to information
asymmetries (see e.g., Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993; Kiyotaki and Moore,
1997). The underlying ideas build upon early literature that can be traced back to prewar theories (see
e.g., Schumpeter, 1934 [1911]; Hayek, 1933).
3Another transmission mechanism that has received much attention in the credit view literature is
the balance sheet channel, also denoted as `nancial accelerator' or `broad' credit channel (Bernanke and
Gertler, 1995). This mechanism emphasizes the role of borrowers' nancial structure in the propagation
of nancial and real shocks. Note that the balance sheet channel can be considered as more general than
the bank lending channel: the latter, which is sometimes referred to as `narrow' credit channel, focuses on
the fact that nancial market imperfections give rise to nancial intermediation through banks.
3imperfections do not play an important role in the transmission process|which is, in
the end, an empirical issue|the transmission of monetary policy can be captured by the
standard money view.
As yet, most empirical evidence for the existence of a bank lending channel has not
been very conclusive. To a large extent, this is due to the fact that most studies based
on aggregated data suer from a severe identication problem: the inability to establish
whether the decrease in credit that is observed after a monetary contraction is induced
by bank supply or driven by a fall in borrowers' demand.4 In the latter case, a lending
channel would be irrelevant. In this respect, recent studies based on disaggregated data
are more informative. The advantage of disaggregated data is that the response of credit
variables can be analysed in combination with other hypotheses that follow from the
theoretical literature underlying the credit view. Information asymmetries, for instance,
are presumably more relevant for specic categories of borrowers which suggests that banks
may try to adjust their loans portfolio following a monetary contraction, substituting
high-quality loans for low-quality loans, known as `ﬂight to quality.' Gertler and Gilchrist
(1993b, 1994) , Oliner and Rudebusch (1996), and Gilchrist and Zakraj sek (1998) use
quarterly panel data of a large number of nonnancial rms in the United States, taking
into account heterogeneity among borrowers. It appears from this research that, following
a monetary contraction, the amount of bank credit to small rms is reduced while large
rms initially even attract more (mostly short-term) credit as a buer to compensate for
declining cash ﬂows. Yet, although this is obviously consistent with the credit view in
the sense that credit is `special,' there still is no general agreement to what extent these
ndings should be interpreted as self-evident support for a bank lending channel.5
Unfortunately, detailed time series at the individual rm or bank level are not avail-
able for most countries. Studies at a sectoral level may be a useful, albeit less rigorous,
alternative.6 In most of these studies, bank lending is split into loans to the corporate
sector and loans to the household sector. It seems plausible that information asymmetries
between banks and households are greater than those between banks and rms.
3 Empirical results
We analyse quarterly data over a sample that runs from 1970:1 up to 1997:4. In the next
subsection we will give a more detailed description of the data (see also Appendix A).
Then, we present our empirical ndings, which consist of impulse-response simulations.
We consider several VARs, starting with a specication based on aggregated data, i.e.,
without making a distinction between sectors. Subsequently, we report the results using
more disaggregated VAR models which focus on the corporate sector and the household
sector.
4See e.g., Barran et al. (1996) for an analysis of nine European countries, Guender and Moersch (1997)
for Germany and Garretsen and Swank (1998a) for the Netherlands.
5See Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) and Kashyap et al. (1996) for a discussion.
6See Escriv a and Haldane (1994) for Spain, Dale and Haldane (1995) for the United Kingdom, and
Kakes (1998) and Garretsen and Swank (1998b) for the Netherlands.
43.1 Data and pre-testing
The data we use can be divided into four categories:
Policy variable: Following Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and most of the subsequent
VAR-based literature on monetary policy transmission, we include a short-term interbank
interest rate as our policy variable in all specications. The corresponding equation in the
VAR can be interpreted as the Bundesbank's reaction function, while innovations of the
short-term interest rate reﬂect unanticipated monetary policy shocks.7
Key macroeconomic variables: We include real activity and prices, since these
are the main variables that reﬂect the eventual eects of monetary policy. We use real
GDP and the GDP deﬂator in our aggregated VAR and corresponding alternatives in our
sectoral specications. In addition to bank balance sheet data (see below), we include two
standard transmission variables: the long-term interest rate and, in order to account for
the openness of the economy, the eective exchange rate.8
Bank balance sheet data: The only bank liability we include is money, either a
narrow aggregate (M1) or a broad aggregate (M3). We include two bank assets: securities
holdings and bank loans. We disaggregate bank lending in two ways. First, we take
into account sectoral dierences by distinguishing a corporate sector and a household
sector. Second, bank loans are split into short-term, medium-term and long-term lending.
Figures 1 and 2 show the developments of these bank assets over our sample. Looking
at the magnitude of the lending categories, it appears that for all maturities corporate
lending is larger than lending to households. Particularly for short-term credit, the bulk
of loans is supplied to rms. Both for rms and households, most bank lending consists
of long-term loans. Looking at the corresponding growth rates for each lending category,
presented in Figure 2, it can be seen that the development in short-term and medium-term
lending is relatively volatile.9 Presumably, this is because the demand for short-term and
medium-term loans can more rapidly be adjusted to changes in interest rates and income.
Long-term lending, by contrast, shows a more stable growth pattern. The proportion of
banks' securities holdings, nally, has become more and more important. Particularly in
the last part of the sample, securities are growing fast. Like short-term and medium-term
lending, the growth rate of securities is rather volatile.
Exogenous variables: To account for supply shocks, we include the oil price as an
exogenous variable. We further add four seasonal dummies and a permanent dummy for
the period from 1990:1 onwards in order to take into account structural changes due to
German reunication.
According to Dickey-Fuller tests that we carried out, all series can be considered as I(1)
variables. Since cointegration can be established for all specications, we estimate our
7See e.g., and Gertler (1996) and Berger and Woitek (1999).
8Instead of taking the eective exchange rate, we also experimented with the DMark/Dollar exchange
rate. Our conclusions do not change.
9Presented are growth rates with respect to the corresponding quarter one year earlier.
5Figure 1: Bank balance sheet variables (in billions of Dmarks)*
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*s-t, m-t and l-t stand for respectively, short-term, medium-term and long-term. We skip the observations
in 1990 because these include a break that reﬂects German reunication.
models as unrestricted VARs in which each series is included in levels. We use likelihood
ratio tests and a ten per cent signicance level to determine the number of lags in our
VARs. In most cases the number of lags equals six.10
Our results consist of innovation analysis which can be performed with an estimated
VAR model, transformed into its moving average representation. Innovations of the short-
term interest rate are interpreted as unanticipated monetary policy shocks. These shocks
are identied by imposing a Wold causal chain in which the policy variable is ordered rst,
and the other variables in the order presented in the impulse-response graphs. We also
investigated alternative orderings, but these did not lead to very dierent outcomes. Each
time, we use a simulation period of four years (16 quarters).
10We tested our VAR models for misspecications using the Ljung-Box Q (1978) test against higher-order
serial correlation and the Bera-Jarque (1981) normality test. No serious problems were encountered.
6Figure 2: Bank balance sheet variables (in growth rates)*
s-t loans









































*s-t, m-t and l-t stand for respectively, short-term, medium-term and long-term. We skip the observations
in 1990 because these include a break that reﬂects German reunication.
3.2 Innovation analysis
Aggregated VAR: We rst analyse a VAR model that only includes aggregated data:
the short-term interest rate, GDP, the GDP deﬂator, total bank loans, money (M3), the
long-term interest rate, the eective exchange rate and banks' securities holdings. All
variables included are in real terms (except both interest rates and the price level) and in
logs (except both interest rates).
Figure 3 plots the dynamic response of each variable following an unanticipated mone-
tary contraction, represented by a shock of about 75 basis points to the short-term interest
rate.
Within four quarters, the policy variable returns to a level not signicantly dierent
from zero.
7Figure 3: Aggregated impulse-responses following a monetary contraction*
KR













































































*KR, GDP, PGDP, BL, SAM3, LR, EXCRATE and DSEC stand for respectively, short-term interbank
interest rate, Gross Domestic Product, GDP deﬂator, bank lending, seasonally-adjusted broad money
aggregate M3, long-term interest rate, eective exchange rate, and banks' securities holdings. This VAR is
estimated using four lags. The dotted lines represent the 95% condence bounds that are calculated using
Monte Carlo integration (see Doan, 1995).
Both GDP and the price level show a negative response that becomes signicant after
about a year, which is a plausible reaction to a monetary contraction. The long-term
interest rate rises about 25 basis points and returns to its initial level, following the same
pattern as the short-term rate. The eective exchange rate does not show any signicant
response, which suggests that the exchange rate is not an important transmission variable.
Banks' securities holdings fall immediately after the monetary contraction, but return
to their baseline level within a year. This suggests that banks use their securities as a
buer stock to oset monetary disturbances.
Bank lending shows a positive response, which is not consistent with the standard
interpretation of a monetary contraction. Apparently, banks do not only shield their
borrowers from monetary disturbances, but even extend their loans supply. This might
be explained by increased demand for|particularly short-term|bank credit by rms in
order to build a liquidity buer.
The response of M3 is also positive, albeit not very signicantly. This is not strange
given the fact that money and credit represent two sides of a bank's balance sheet and are
therefore related. The fact that the responses of these variables follow a similar pattern
conrms this view. Furthermore, it is quite common to nd a positive short-term interest
rate elasticity of broad money demand (see Fase, 1994). Nevertheless, given the fact that
M3 has served as an intermediate target of monetary policy since the early 1980s, one
would expect that a monetary tightening has a negative impact on this broad money
8Figure 4: Aggregated impulse-response of M1 following a monetary contraction*
SAM1










*SAM1 stands for seasonally-adjusted narrow money aggregate M1. This VAR is estimated using seven lags.
The dotted lines represent the 95% condence bounds that are calculated using Monte Carlo integration
(see Doan, 1995).
aggregate.11
We repeated the analysis with a VAR in which we replaced M3 by the narrow aggregate
M1. This time, money shows an immediate negative response, as can be seen in Figure
4. The responses of the other variables are very similar to those in Figure 3 and are
therefore not reported. The result that M1 shows a|plausible|negative reaction can be
explained by the fact that a narrow aggregate contains fewer interest-bearing elements,
which makes a positive relationship between money and interest rates unlikely. In addition,
M1 represents a smaller part of the liability side of the banking sector's balance sheet than
M3 and is therefore not as tightly related to developments in bank lending.
Disaggregated VARs: In separate specications for the corporate sector and the
household sector, we replace GDP by industrial production and household expenditures,
respectively, and the GDP deﬂator by the producer price index and the household expen-
ditures deﬂator. In addition, we include bank lending to rms and households, rather than
aggregated credit. The responses of real activity, the price level and credit are reported in
Figure 5.
Regarding the eventual eects of monetary policy on activity and prices, the sectoral
dierences are substantial. Industrial production shows a borderline-signicant decrease,
11Our ndings are consistent with recent studies (Clarida and Gertler, 1996; Bernanke and Mihov, 1997)
which conclude that, in spite of its monetary strategy of money targeting, in practice the Bundesbank's
monetary policy has been much more pragmatic. In addition, it should be noted that the Bundesbank has
actually missed its money growth target in about half of the years since it introduced money targeting.
9Figure 5: Sectoral disaggregated impulse-responses following a monetary contraction*
INDPR


































































*INDPR, PINDPR, BLQB, SAHHEXP, SAPHHEXP and BLQG stand for respectively, industrial
production, producer price index, bank loans to enterprises, seasonally-adjusted household expenditures,
deﬂator of household expenditures, and banks' lending to households. These two VARs are estimated
using six lags. The dotted lines represent the 95% condence bounds that are calculated using Monte
Carlo integration (see Doan, 1995).
comparable|albeit less pronounced|with the response of GDP in Figure 3. Household
expenditures, by contrast, do not seem to respond at all, at least not signicantly. Ap-
parently, monetary policy has more real impact on rms than on households. Looking at
the response of prices, it is striking that the price index of household expenditures falls,
whereas producer prices increase. The latter is obviously in contradiction with the ex-
pected result of a monetary contraction, and also with our aggregated VAR simulations.
This perverse response of prices shows up in many VAR-based studies and may be an
indication that an important variable is omitted. Including the oil price or a commodity
price index, as Sims (1992) suggests, in order to take into account supply eects, does not
resolve this price puzzle. Dale and Haldane (1995) suggest that the positive response of
prices after a monetary tightening may be explained by increasing variable costs which
initially translate into higher prices due to cost mark-up pricing. The response of bank
credit is very similar for both sectors, showing an increase immediately after the monetary
tightening.
Figure 6 shows the results of simulations with a VAR in which bank lending has been
disaggregated on the basis of debt maturity, instead of sectors, distinguishing short-term,
10Figure 6: Maturity disaggregated impulse-responses following a monetary contraction*
BLL




























*BLL, BLM and BLK stand for respectively, long-term bank loans, medium-term bank loans and
short-term bank loans. This VAR is estimated using six lags. The dotted lines represent the 95%
condence bounds that are calculated using Monte Carlo integration (see Doan, 1995).
medium-term and long-term lending (see Figures 1 and 2). It appears that long-term
credit|which represents the bulk of total bank lending in Germany|hardly responds,
whereas short-term and medium-term credit show a very signicant increase. A positive
response of short-term credit following a monetary contraction has been observed in many
other studies.12 This may be explained by the fact that borrowers try to shorten the
maturity of their (new) debt as a response to increases|and an anticipation to future
decreases|in the lending rate. Another explanation, which is perhaps more relevant here,
since we observe a borderline-signicant decline in GDP and industrial production, is that
rms face declining cash ﬂows due to a drop in sales which induces them to demand more
short-term credit in order to build a liquidity buer.
In Figure 7, nally, we present the responses of short, medium and long-term lending
for each sector. Interestingly, the `non-response' of total long-term credit that we just
observed appears to be the net result of a decline in long-term lending to the corporate
sector and a temporary increase in long-term lending to the household sector. The slow
response of long-term corporate lending|which coincides with the fall in GDP and indus-
trial production, see Figures 3 and 5|suggests that this is induced by demand, rather than
supply. Presumably, monetary policy has a real impact on the corporate sector through
other transmission channels (e.g., the standard interest rate channel) while bank lending
follows passively. The initial positive response of long-term household lending is some-
what puzzling. A possible explanation is that the mortgage lending rate is adjusted with
a signicant lag to changes in the policy-controlled short-term interest rate, which can be
a reason to increase the demand for mortgages immediately after a monetary contraction,
in order to still benet from the lower mortgage rate. For short-term and medium-term
credit, sectoral dierences are not substantial. As we already noted, the positive response
of short-term and medium-term lending may be attributed to the fact that borrowers use
this type of credit as a liquidity buer.
12See e.g., Gertler and Gilchrist (1993a) for the United States and Kakes (1998) for the Netherlands.
11Figure 7: Sectoral and maturity disaggregated impulse-responses following a monetary
contraction*
BLLQB






























































*BLLQB, BLMQB, BLKQB, BLLQG, BLMQG and BLKQG stand for respectively, long term bank
loans to enterprises, medium-term bank loans to enterprised, short-term bank loans to enterprises,
long-term bank loans to households, medium-term bank loans to households and short-term bank loans
to households. These two VARS are estimated using respectively six and four lags. The dotted lines
represent the 95% condence bounds that are calculated using Monte Carlo integration (see Doan, 1995).
Evaluation: In sum, we can conclude that bank lending does not seem to be an
eective transmission channel of monetary policy in Germany. The results suggest that
both banks and borrowers show buer behaviour in order to oset the impact of monetary
shocks. Banks respond to a monetary tightening by immediately decreasing their securities
holdings, whereas they insulate their loans portfolio from monetary disturbances. For
banks, securities holdings thus seem to serve as a liquidity buer. Borrowers, in turn,
respond to a monetary contraction by increasing their demand for short-term and medium-
term loans, which is satised by the banks. Hence, rather than providing an eective
transmission channel, banks are more likely to weaken the impact of monetary policy.
Presumably, monetary policy may have real aects via other transmission channels|
e.g., the long-term interest rate|which are more relevant for rms than for households.
In this respect, it is also interesting to note that, insofar as the real eects of monetary
policy in both sectors are reﬂected by household expenditures and industrial production,
only the latter falls signicantly after a monetary contraction.
The interpretation of our results is consistent with the notion that long-term relation-
ships between banks and their customers are important in Germany. It should be noted,
12though, that we have made a relatively crude disaggregation by distinguishing only two
sectors, rms and households. Obviously, a further disaggregation of borrower types is
needed to draw more rigorous conclusions. As we indicated, client relationships that may
oset monetary policy shocks are presumably more relevant for large, creditworthy rms
than for smaller borrowers. Panel data studies by Audretsch and Elston (1994), Elston
(1996) and Bond et al. (1997) conclude that German rms' investments are sensitive to
nancial constraints. Especially small rms are vulnerable, which suggests that a further
disaggregation of the corporate sector is useful. Note, though, that these micro-based
studies do not explicitly consider monetary policy.
3.3 Robustness
We estimated all VAR specications for various sub-samples. We let the sample start in
1973:1, the end of the Bretton Woods system, and in 1975:1, when the Bundesbank started
its policy of monetary growth targeting. In addition, we checked what would happen if
we end the sample in 1990:1 (German unication). Although these dates mark important
shifts in the German economy, neither of these alternative had much impact on our results.
4 Concluding remarks
In this study we have investigated the relevance of a bank lending channel of monetary
policy transmission for the German economy. We performed VAR analysis to investigate
the eects of unanticipated monetary policy shocks at the aggregate level as well as pos-
sible dierences between the household sector and the corporate sector. An important
conclusion is that banks seem to use their securities holdings as a buer stock, which
enables them to shield their loans portfolio from monetary disturbances. Whereas most
other transmission variables show a plausible response following a monetary contraction,
we observe that aggregate bank credit increases, which implies that a bank lending channel
is not a relevant transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Rather, the opposite seems
more likely, as borrowers appear to use their relationship with a bank to increase their
lending, which may enable them to oset the eects of monetary policy through other
channels such as the interest rate channel and the exchange rate channel.
It is interesting to note that our results do not suggest a `ﬂight to quality' following a
monetary contraction, at least if households are supposed to be the low quality borrowers.
Of course, this mechanism could still be relevant among dierent classes of German rms.
Hence, a natural extension of this study would be to make a further disaggregation of the
corporate sector.
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15A Data
For most series, we use seasonally unadjusted data. Seasonal eects are taken into account
by including a dummy for each quarter. Most data are taken from the Bundesbank, the
IMF's International Financial Statistics (IFS) and Datastream.
 Bank balance sheet data. Banks' securities holdings and credit aggregates are
taken from the Bundesbank CD-ROM, which contains data reported in the Bun-
desbank's Monatsberichte (monthly reports). We corrected for a break in the credit
aggregates in 1980Q3 by premultiplying the earlier observations by the ratio of the
values at 1980Q3 under the new and old denition. M3 and M1 are taken from the
IFS in seasonally adjusted form.
 Real activity, prices. For the aggregated model, we include real GDP as a measure
of real activity, and the implicit GDP deﬂator as the price index. Both are taken
from the IFS. For the corporate sector, we use industrial production and the producer
price index from the IFS. For the household sector, we use the volume of total
household expenditures and the corresponding deﬂator, both taken from Datastream
in seasonally adjusted form. In order to allow a direct comparison of the magnitudes
of these variables among the models, we normalized all activity and price indices by
dividing them by their 1980Q1 observation. In all models, we include the oil price,
taken from the IFS.
 Exchange rate, interest rates. In each model, we include the nominal eective
exchange rate, based on unit labour costs, taken from the IFS database. An increase
in this variable reﬂects an appreciation of the Dmark. The short-term interest rate
is the three-month interbank rate, and the long-term interest rate is the government
bond yield, both taken from the IFS.
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